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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
E. MARLOWE GOBLE, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. ) 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY ) Case No. 940268-CA 
COMPANY, ) 
) Trial Court No. 930000023 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Order on Summary Judgment from which this appeal is 
taken was entered by the Court on February 3, 1994. The Notice 
of Appeal was filed February 25, 1994. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this matter 
by virtue of the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 
et. sea., Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2, and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. This case was poured-over to this Court 
from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented is whether under the language of the 
automobile insurance policy in question the insured should be 
entitled to damages equal to the diminution in the value of a 
wrecked automobile when the insurance company elects to repair 
rather than replace the vehicle. In this particular case the 
value of the vehicle after the repairs were made was less than 
its value immediately prior to the accident. The language in the 
policy says that the insurer will pay to the insured the amount 
of loss to a car involved in a collision less deductibles. The 
limit of liability portion of the policy states: "The limit of 
our liability for loss to property or any part of it is the lower 
of: (1) the actual cash value, or (2) the cost of repair or 
replacement." 
Since this is an appeal of a summary judgment, the standard 
of review is that the Appeals Court reviews only conclusions of 
law because, by definition, cases decided on summary judgment do 
not resolve factual disputes. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Schurtz 
v. BMW of North America, Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah App. 1991); 
Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). No 
deference is given to the trial court's legal conclusions, but 
they are reviewed for correctness. See, Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 
1307, 1309 (Utah 1990); Landes. supra, 795 P.2d at 1129. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, OR RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This case involves an action 
against the insurance company which insured an automobile which 
was involved in an accident. Although the insurance company 
elected to repair the vehicle rather than replace it, the value 
after the repairs were made was significantly less than its value 
before the accident and the insured sued for the difference. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. The insured filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment asking the court to rule on the 
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measure of damages to be applied in the case given the language 
in the policy. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court. Both parties filed 
memoranda regarding the motion for partial summary judgment. 
After a hearing on the motion, the trial court ruled that the 
insurance policy did not cover diminution in value and dismissed 
the insured's complaint with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff-insured purchased a policy of insurance with 
collision coverage for his automobile from the Defendant-insurer. 
2. The automobile in question was involved in an accident 
and the insurer elected under the policy to repair the vehicle. 
3. The insured asserted that the value after the repairs 
was less than the value just prior to the accident to the extent 
of approximately $15,000 and made demand on the insurer for the 
difference. 
4. The insurer declined to pay and this action was brought 
for recovery of the difference in value. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The argument of the insured is that the policy which he 
purchased was to compensate for the loss which could occur to his 
automobile in the event of an accident and that loss includes 
diminution in value. 
ARGUMENT 
The specific issue on which the insured (Appellant) is 
entitled to summary judgment is the interpretation of the 
language in the insurer's automobile insurance policy which 
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covers physical damage loss in the event of collision. There is 
no dispute that a collision involving Plaintiff's vehicle which 
was covered by Defendant's policy occurred. The dispute, as 
admitted in Defendant's answer, is whether the policy has 
coverage for diminution of value. The Defendant-Insurer has 
denied coverage under its policy for loss in value to the 
automobile after repairs and the trial court found "that the 
settlement of the loss was appropriately concluded by State Farm 
in accordance with the terms and provisions of the insurance 
policy in repairing the vehicle with parts and components of like 
kind and quality." The Plaintiff's assertion is that if, after 
the repairs are completed, the vehicle is less valuable than 
before that the language of the policy requires that he be 
compensated for the difference, since it was at State Farm's 
election that the vehicle be repaired. 
The specific language in question is found in Section IV— 
Physical Damage Coverages of the Defendant's policy, a copy of 
which appears in the Addendum to this brief. The basic 
provisions provide that the insurer will pay to the insured the 
amount of loss to a car involved in a collision less deductibles. 
The insurer has the option to repair or replace the vehicle as 
set forth in the Limit of Liability portion: "The limit of our 
liability for loss to property or any part of it is the lower of: 
(1) the actual cash value, or (2) the cost of repair or 
replacement." 
State Farm opted to repair the vehicle in question and has 
asserted that even though the value after repairs is 
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significantly less than it was on the date of the accident that 
Plaintiff is not entitled to be paid the difference. The case 
law in this area is quite extensive and is set forth in 
43 A.L.R.2d 327. Section 4 sets forth the following summary of 
the law reflected in the annotation: 
It has been held or recognized in a number of 
cases that an element of damage for which recovery 
may be had under an automobile collision insurance 
policy is the difference in value before the 
collision and after repairs have been made. 
In particular, the Kansas case which is annotated at 68 
A.L.R.3d 1184, Venable v. Import Volkswagen, 519 P.2d 667 (Kan. 
1974), sets forth the applicable law in a well-reasoned opinion. 
The policy language in that case is virtually identical to the 
language in the policy which is in question here. The Kansas 
Supreme Court quoted 15 Couch on Insurance 2d, @ 54:30, p. 338, 
As a condition to the exercise of the 
election to repair or rebuild, it is 
essential that the property be in such 
condition that it can be repaired or rebuilt 
and thereby be restored to its condition 
prior to the loss. Consequently, where the 
property cannot be so restored or repaired, 
the insurer cannot discharge its obligation 
by attempting to make a restoration or 
reconstruction which by definition will not 
be successful. (Accord, 8 Blashfield 
Automobile Law and Practice, @ 343.10, p. 
338. ) 
The Court held: 
When an insurer makes an election to repair or 
rebuild under a "repair, restore or replace 
clause" in its policy the insurer is then 
obligated to put the vehicle in substantially the 
same condition as it was prior to the collision so 
as to render it as valuable and as serviceable as 
before. (Emphasis added.) 
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It then cited the same treatises quoted above for this 
proposition: 
Moreover, when an insurer elects to repair 
the vehicle it is bound by its election and 
any resulting damages are based on the 
agreement to repair, so that the damages 
recoverable may in such case be more or less 
than the amount of the loss suffered under 
the policy. 
In Campbell v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 109 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 
1959), the Supreme Court of South Carolina said: 
... [W]here there is a partial loss and the 
automobile can be repaired and restored to 
its former condition and value, the cost of 
repairs is the measure of liability, less any 
deductible sum specified in the policy. But 
if, despite such repairs, there yet remains a 
loss in actual value, estimated as of the 
collision date, the insured is entitled to 
compensation for such deficiency. 
There is another line of cases which takes a contrary view 
but this is a question of first impression in Utah. A recent 
case dealing with this issue with State Farm as defendant and 
consequently the identical policy language is Delledonne v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 621 A.2d 350 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1992). In this case decided by a Delaware Superior 
Court, the two distinct lines of cases are listed and analyzed, 
and the Court holds: 
This Court finds the better view to be that 
of the majority of jurisdictions, however, 
which hold that an insurer's provision to 
"repair or replace" a vehicle or its parts 
with "like kind and quality," requires that 
the insurer pay for diminution in value... 
The underlying rationale for these decisions 
is essentially that in the context of an 
insurance contract, the words "repair or 
replace" with "like kind and quality" mean 
the restoration of the vehicle to 
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substantially the same condition as prior to 
the damage; and restoration to such condition 
can not be said to have been effected if the 
repairs fail to render the vehicle as 
valuable as before. 
This would appear to be the appropriate rule of law in Utah 
as well and should be followed by this Court. The only case 
found in Utah which even relates to the issue is very brief and 
does not directly address the issue. Sew v. Utah Farm Bureau 
Insurance Company, 334 P.2d 554 (Utah 1959) merely says: 
"Generally, car damage is determinable by expert testimony as to 
repair cost, or by showing the differential in market value 
before and after the incident initiating the damage." The court 
in that case was merely evaluating whether damages could be 
awarded based on the purchase price of the car since the evidence 
on repair cost had been deemed inadmissible. The implication is 
that a proper measure of damages is the value of the automobile 
just prior to the accident. 
The language in the policy which requires an insurer to 
"repair or replace" the damaged automobile with "like kind or 
quality" (especially where the insurer has the right to make the 
election) certainly means that the purpose of the policy is to 
compensate the insured for any loss or damage, less the 
deductible. If the vehicle cannot be repaired so that it is 
worth what it was before the accident, then it needs to be 
replaced. It appears that the trial court in this case focused 
on the concept of replacing "parts and components with like kind 
and quality." This interpretation implies that a person buys a 
collision policy to replace parts and components, rather than to 
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insure against the loss of an automobile. Taken to the extreme, 
if, after repairs with parts and components of like kind and 
quality the car does not run, the policy is meaningless. This, 
of course, is why the policy allows the payment of the actual 
cash value or the cost of repair or replacement. This, however, 
should not be construed as allowing State Farm to return to the 
owner an automobile which is not what it was before the accident, 
namely, something less than "like kind and quality." The vehicle 
must be looked at as a whole and not as constituent parts and 
components. 
State Farm asserted in arguments in the trial court that the 
duty of the insurer is to "substantially" restore the vehicle to 
its condition prior to the accident. (See page 38 of the Record 
on Appeal.) This merely shifts the focus to a discussion of what 
"substantially" means. The best method of maintaining the 
integrity of the policy is to require the insurer to make up the 
difference if the repair does not restore the vehicle to its 
value prior to the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to partial 
summary judgment that the appropriate measure of damages includes 
diminution of value. 
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Dated this ^ ? day of July, 1994. 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
T N r SON 
for Plaintiff/Appellant 
(original signature) 
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ADDENDUM 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY 
POLICY, SECTION IV - PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGES 
SECTION IV - PHYSICAL DAMAGE COVERAGES 
Gothcs and 
Coverages 
I. 
2. 
Loss - means, when used inthis section, each direct and 
accidental loss of or damage im *•* 
1. your car; 
2. its equipment which is common to the use of yom 
car as a vehicle; or 
3. clothes and luggage insured; and 
4. a detachable living quarters attached or removed 
from your car for storage. Detachable living 
quarters includes its body and items securely fixed 
in place as a permanent part of the body. You must 
have told us about the living quarters before the loss 
and paid any extra premium needed. 
COMPREHENSIVE - COVERAGE D. You have this 
coverage if "D" appears in the "Coverages" space on the 
declarations page. If a deductible applies, the amount is 
shown by the number beside "D". 
1. Loss to Your Car. We will pay for loss to your car 
EXCEPT LOSS BY COLUSIONbul only for the 
amounl of each such loss in excess of the deductible 
amount, if any. 
Breakage of glass, or /<J.W caused by missiles, falling 
objects, lire, 'theft, larceny, explosion, earthquake, 
windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or 
vandalism, riot or civil commotion, is payable 
under this coverage. Loss due to hitting or being 
hit by a bird or an animal is payable under this 
coverage. 
2. We will repay you for transportation costs ft your 
car is stolen. We will pay up to $16 per day for the 
period that begins 48 hours after you tell us of the 
theft. The period ends when we offer to pay for 
loss. 
COLLISION - 80% - COVERAGE F. You have this 
coverage if "F" appears in the "Coverages" space on the 
declarations page. 
We will pay 80% of the first $250 and l(X)% over thsil 
amount of loss to your car caused by collision. If the collision 
is with another motor vehicle insured by us, we will pay 
100% of the/rw. 
COLLISION - COVERAGE G. You have this coverage 
if "G" np|7ears in the "Coverages" space on the declarations 
page. The deductible amount is shown by the number beside 
"G". 
We will pay for loss to your car caused by collision but only 
for the amount of each such loss in excess of the deductible 
amount. If the collision is with another motor vehicle 
insured with us, you do not pay your deductible if it is $100 
or less as we pay it. |. 
CoWsion - means your car upset or hit or was hit by a 2. 
vehicle or other object. 
16 
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luggage - Comprehensive and Collision 
We will pay for loss to clothes and luggage owned by the 
first person named in the declarations, his or her spouse, and 
their relatives. These items have to be in or on your car. 
Your car has to be covered under this policy for: 
Comprehensive, and the loss caused by fire, 
lightning, flood, falling objects, explosion, 
earthquake or theft. If the loss is due to theft, 
YOUR ENTIRE CAR MUST HAVE BEEN 
STOLEN; or 
Collision, and the loss caused by collision. 
We will pay up to $200 for bss to clothes and luggage in 
excess of any deductible amount shown for comprehensive 
or collision. $200 is the most we will pay in any one 
occurrence even though more than one person has a loss. 
This coverage is excess over any other coverage. 
I Jinit of liability — Comprehensive and Collision Coverages 
y'hc limit of our liability for loss to property or any part of 
it is the lower of: 
1. the actual cash value, or ^ 
2. the cost of repair or replacement/ 
Actual cash value is determined by the market value, age 
and condition at the time the loss occurred. Any deductible 
amount that applies is then subtracted. The cost of repair 
or replacement is based upon: 
1. the cost of repair agreed upon by you and us, or 
2. the lower of: 
a. a competitive bid approved by us, or 
b. an estimate written based upon the prevailing 
competitive price. The prevailing competitive 
price means labor rates, parts prices and 
material prices charged by a substantial 
number of the repair facilities in the area where 
the car is to be repaired as determined by a 
survey made by us. \fyou ask, we will identify 
some facilities that will perform the repairs at 
the prevailing competitive price. 
Any deductible amount that applies is then subtracted. 
Settlement of IJOSS - Comprehensive and Collision 
Coverages 
We have the right to settle a loss with you or the owner of 
the property in one of the following ways: 
pay up to the actual cash value; 
pay to repair or replace the property or part with 
like kind and quality. If the repair or replacement 
4. 
results in better than like kind and quality,you must 
pay for the amount of the betterment; 
return the stolen property and pay for any damage 
due to the theft; or 
take the property at an agreed value; but it cannot 
be abandoned to us. 
If we can pay the loss under either comprehensive or 
collision, we will pay under the coverage where yon collect 
the most. 
When there is bss to yom car, clothes and luggage in the 
same occurrence, any deductible will be applied first to the 
loss to your car. You pay only one deductible. 
EMERGENCY ROAD SERVICE - COVERAGE II. 
You have this coverage if "H" appears in the "Coverages" 
space on the declarations page. 
We will pay the fair cost you incur for your car for: 
1. mechanical labor up to one hour at the place of its 
breakdown; 
2. towing to the nearest place where the necessary 
repairs can be made during regular business hours 
if it will not run; 
3. towing it out if it is stuck on or immediately next ,lo 
a public highway; 
4. delivery of gas, oil, loaned battery, or change of tine. 
WE IX) NOT PAY FOR THE COST OF 
THESE ITEMS. 
CAR RENTAL EXPENSE ~ COVERAGE R. You have 
this coverage if "R" appears in the "Coverages" space on 
the declarations page. 
We will repay yon up to $10 per day when you rent a car 
from a car rental agency or garage due to a loss to your car 
which would be payable under coverage D, F or G, starting: 
1. when it cannot run due to the loss; or 
2. if it can run, when you leave it at the shop for 
agreed repairs; 
and ending when: 
1. it has been repaired or replaced, or 
2. we offer to pay for the loss, or 
3. you incur 30 days rent, 
whichever comes first. 
Any car rent payable under coverage R is REDUCED 1 0 
THE EXTENT IT IS PAYABLE UNDER 
COMPREHENSIVE. 
CAR RENTAL AND TRAVEL EXPENSES 
COVERAGE RL You have this coverage If "RT appears 
in the "Coverages" space on the declarations page. 
I. Car Rental Expense. We will: 
17 
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